kazi Emdadul Haque
Introduction: India’s strategic ambition to position itself as a peer competitor to China has drawn mixed reactions across the Indo-Pacific. Littoral states are wary of shifting power dynamics. Amid U.S.-China economic competition, India is trying to play its role, ranging from realpolitik to leaning toward U.S. interests while struggling to hold its ground in the Indian Ocean. India’s attempts to balance realpolitik with aspirational leadership have so far yielded limited dividends, leaving its regional standing increasingly uncertain.
India’s One-Dimensional Desire
Recently, remarks by Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM), Dr. S. Jaishankar, at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York have been widely discussed. His two important remarks are widely quoted:
- “Both China and India are rising powers in Asia”.
- “If the world is to be multipolar, Asia has to be multipolar”.
Figure: The Economic power indicator between China and India.
Let’s compare India’s parity with China briefly. The power indicator reveals a stark imbalance in nearly every domain of power. China is not a “rising power”—it is already a dominant global force with a GDP of nearly $17.7 trillion, compared to India’s $3.9 trillion. Its per capita income is five times higher, and its defence spending almost triples India’s. China leads the world in cutting-edge technologies like AI, quantum computing, and 5G, and commands significant influence through institutions like the UN Security Council, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Its vast manufacturing base and trade dominance underscore its global economic clout. Meanwhile, India, though growing steadily, remains a regional player, still developing its infrastructure and global reach. The comparison highlights a crucial reality: while India is rising, China has already achieved. Framing both as equals may be politically convenient, but it misrepresents the geopolitical truth.
Can India ever surpass or beat China on any issues? All South Asian countries now have more economic interactions and interdependencies with China than India. India imports $113bn from China and exports just $14bn to China in 2024.
Also, it is worth mentioning that the preserved Indian economic rise is mainly due to the cheap oil purchased from Russia and sold to EU countries against the American sanction on Russian oil purchase.
In fact, polarisation has to be among the great powers, not India. India is far away from being a great power. Moreover, inviting Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir to Whitehouse is a clear signal to India that India is not the only player in the region. So, what EAM is trying to preach has less merit.
The reality is that no country wants to be dominated either by India or China. Asian countries:
- Prefer strategic flexibility over alignment;
- Want to preserve autonomy;
- Use issue-based partnerships (e.g., maritime security with India, trade with China, defence with the U.S.).
Great Powers’ Geopolitics in the Region
The growing rivalry among great powers—the U.S., China, and Russia—has made the Indo-Pacific a strategic battleground, leaving smaller littoral countries with limited space to navigate their own path to prosperity. The intense Sino-U.S. competition, combined with India’s close ties to Russia, has turned the Indian Ocean region into a chessboard for great power interests. These global players often exploit the political weaknesses and fragile democracies of South Asian countries to advance their agendas.
Bangladesh, for example, saw its previous regime remain in power for over 15 years with strong backing from India. Nepal is moving closer to China economically, while Myanmar presents a deeply complex case. Credible reports suggest that China supports both the military junta and ethnic rebels in Rakhine, where India also operates the Kaladan project under rebel-held areas. China’s China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and India’s strategic interests now overlap in conflict zones, making the regional landscape increasingly unstable. Solving such layered geopolitical challenges is far from simple and requires deeper, unbiased regional cooperation—something that remains elusive.
Playing Realpolitik
India views the Indian Ocean as a zone of strategic importance and takes pride in its role as a regional security provider. With tacit U.S. support, New Delhi has positioned itself as a counterbalance to China’s growing influence in these waters. However, to remain a security leader, India needs credible threats in the region.
During President Trump’s second term, his focus seemed to be more on economic competition rather than addressing security threats in the Indian Ocean region.
Recently, the UN Secretary-General’s visit to Bangladesh and the probable humanitarian corridor to Rakhine are positive steps that could help reduce tensions in the region. Additionally, reports suggest that Pakistan has been trying to improve relations with its neighbours, including India. At the same time, growing cooperation between Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan in areas like trade and security could further stabilise the region.
So, what’s the significance of improved relationships in the region? If the above trends continue, the overall security threats in the region may decrease significantly. If no real threats exist in the Indian Ocean, India struggles to justify its role as a ‘net security provider’ against China. Without clear dangers, its strong naval presence may look like expansion for its own sake, not a necessity. That’s why some believe India benefits from keeping tensions alive—or even exaggerating threats—to validate its military dominance. If regional stability grows, hardliners argue that perceived risks must be maintained to defend India’s strategic influence, hence, framing every neighbour as a potential adversary.
India never showed any interest in resolving the Rohingya issues, even though PM Modi had a good relationship with the ousted PM Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh. India continues to buy Russian oil despite Western pressure, citing national energy needs and strategic autonomy.
The growing cooperation between Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan is indeed a good initiative for the region but a security concern for India. This is primarily due to the potential for a strengthened alliance that could challenge India’s regional dominance and create a more complex geopolitical landscape.
Whenever China wanted to improve its relationship with India, India attached a string of conditions that the border issues needed to be discussed first. Of course, it’s a complex issue and difficult to resolve in a short period of time. So, the Indo-China relationship remained at a stalemate, and hence, the regional harmony and cohesion are unmet.
Conclusion
In summary, India’s regional leadership aspirations face stark realities. While India aspires to play a central role in perceived multipolar Asia, its foreign policy—particularly its handling of neighbours, border dynamics, and alignment strategies—has raised concerns.
Compared not only to China but also to several other Asian nations, India lags significantly in critical areas—governance, human development, and technological advancement. Leadership in the modern era cannot be asserted by ambition alone; it demands demonstrable strength. Current economic trends suggest most Asian nations are likely to align with China or other established powers, leaving India’s policymakers at risk of isolating the country rather than elevating it.