kazi emdadul haq: In the afterglow of Trump’s election, some in India celebrated Trump’s victory, with a high hope of “Howdy Modi’s” best friend is back to save BJP’s desire to make Modi a great leader in the Asian region. Inviting America’s influential figures they felt a connection to—Tulsi Gabbard, a Hindu American (though not of Indian origin), and Vice President J.D. Vance, whose wife Usha is Indian American, India was trying to send message across its neighbours to justify its regional supremacy.
That mood cooled within months as the new White House slapped steep tariffs on India, souring expectations. What began as symbolic affinity quickly ran into hard economics—reminding everyone that cultural ties and diaspora pride can’t override policy shocks. Howdy Modi is now making new friend in China trying to tune music of “elephant and dragon” dance. Is India really moving to make a closer tie with its neighbours or this is again India’s skewed foreign policy?
India has historically shown little genuine interest in improving relations with its neighbours, particularly China and Pakistan. This stance serves a strategic purpose: it allows India to maintain a perception of regional threat, which it leverages to justify its position as a rising power and self-appointed guardian of the Indian Ocean.
For a long time, the United States supported this balance of power as a means to counter Chinese influence. However, this strategic equation upended by two key developments: the imposition of Trump’s tariffs and the burgeoning U.S.-Pakistan rapport under Field Marshal Asim Munir, which created a new “Howdy Munir” dynamic to rival the previous “Howdy Modi” era.
India is facing growing international criticism, particularly from the United States and the European Union, for its significant increase in purchasing cheap Russian oil. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, India bought negligible amounts of Russian crude. However, since the invasion, Russia has offered heavily discounted prices, leading India’s share of Russian oil imports to surge to 39%—worth an estimated $162 billion.
Western nations argue that these substantial payments are effectively helping to fund President Putin’s war machine, enabling Russia to continue its military aggression in Ukraine. This is why former Trum’s trade advisor Peter Navarro famously labelled these transactions as “blood money”, and why there are now serious discussions in Washington about imposing higher tariffs on Indian goods.
Furthermore, the United States is also encouraging the EU to take similar measures, potentially disrupting Indian exports to European markets. This puts India in a difficult position: while leveraging cheap oil benefits its economy, it also carries serious diplomatic and trade consequences.
After the tariff pressure of the Trump era, India signalled greater interest in working with neighbouring states, although rapprochement with China or Pakistan has yet to materialise in true sense. The world is closely watching as Trump’s tariffs have triggered a short-term shift in South Asia. Modi’s first China visit in seven years for the SCO summit in Tianjin (31 Aug to 1 Sep 2025), where Xi spoke of the “dragon and elephant could dance together”. Both leaders were found to be happily braced together. At the summit, the Tianjin Declaration with the theme “One Earth, One Family, One Future”, was adopted, which was an Indian initiative.
It’s striking—and promising—to see Xi, Modi, and Putin work to ease China–India tensions under a ‘one family’ ideal. India’s neighbours would be thrilled if that spirit truly binds South Asia—let alone the wider world. This dramatic and hopeful shift in diplomacy is now being closely watched by a global audience anticipating its outcome.
If Donald Trump could help bring China and India closer, it would be one of the biggest achievements of his career. But let’s be honest: would America really want that? For years, the USA has seen India as a useful partner to help balance China’s growing influence—so much so that it even renamed its military presence in the region the “Indo-Pacific Command” to highlight India’s role.
Now, the self-imposed trade taxes have put Trump in a tricky position. By trying to punish countries like China, Russia, and India, he may actually be pushing them closer together—and that could end up working against America’s own interests.
In the recent past, India has showed some interests to move slightly closer to China: China-India border de-escalation, both sides eased visa rules, direct flights resumed after five years, and so on. Despite the constructive rhetoric, India’s foreign policy remains difficult for its neighbours to interpret.
Many analysts see this as a hedge, not a lasting pivot. Guided by strategic autonomy, India is balancing ties with China while maintaining strong links with the United States and other partners. The current warmth looks like a transactional thaw that could reverse quickly. It reminds the interlocutors about the cliché that “a friend in need is a friend indeed” which applies here in a narrow sense: both sides want less friction now, so they cooperate where convenient. That is an overlap of interests, not true friendship.
Seasoned and shrewd veterans like Xi and Putin have long recognised that Trump is an unpredictable and unreliable partner. More recently, European leaders have also come to the sobering realisation that Trump cannot be considered a genuine or steadfast ally to the EU—a stark contrast to the deep and trusted transatlantic partnership of the past.
Although belatedly, Prime Minister Modi has now gradually awakened to the stark reality that Trump will never extend truly friendly cooperation to India. Nevertheless, as the adage goes, better late than never. Modi has wisely embarked on a new diplomatic approach, seeking to reduce dangerous geopolitical misunderstandings with China.
This profound and strategic shift in India’s foreign policy, if pursued with genuine commitment, could mark a truly historic serendipity—one with the potential to restore lasting stability, peace, and security across the entire South Asian region.
